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ABSTRACT
This thesis provides a survey on optimal monetary policy under different wage and price contracts in a framework of
a closed economy. We have optimal monetary policy either minimizing the loss function whose determinants are
inflation and output gap or maximizing the representative agent’s utility. In the thesis, we focus on the importance of
nominal rigidities and New Keynesian model which we believe to give the best response to an optimal monetary
policy. We will see that in recent literature, a Central  Bank will generally be unable to eliminate completely the
distortions caused by nominal rigidities. The optimal policy should involve balance between stabilization of three
variables:  the output  gap,  price inflation and wage inflation.  Therefore  we  investigate  monetray policy tradeoff
between discretion and commitment with and without distortions. At the end, we see that optimal monetary policy
under commitment is better  than discretion.
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ÖZET
Bu tez, kapalı bir ekonomide, farklı ücret ve fiyat sözleşmeleri altında en iyi para politikası konusunda bir literatür
taramasıdır. En iyi para politikasını, belirleyici faktörleri enflasyon ve üretim açığı olan zarar fonksiyonunu en aza
indirgediğimiz veya temsilci kişinin faydasını azami ölçüde arttırdığımız zaman elde edebiliriz. Tezde ücret ve fiyat
yapışkanlığının  önemi ve para politikasına  en iyi yanıtı  verdiğine  inandığımız New Keynesyen Model  üzerinde
durduk. Yakın zamanda yapılan araştırmalara göre, Merkez Bankası nominal katılıklardan kaynaklanan bozulmaları
tamamen yok edememektedir. En iyi politika üretim açığı, fiyat enflasyonu ve ücret enflasyonu arasında bir denge
içermelidir.  Bu yüzden, bozulmaların olduğu ve de olmadığı durumlarda, ihtiyati ve kurala dayalı para politikası
arasındaki ilişkileri inceledik. Sonunda, kurala dayalı para politikasının daha iyi sonuç verdiğini gördük.  
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1 INTRODUCTION
Monetary economics investigates the relationship between real economic
variables at the aggregate level - such as output, interest rate, employment
and exchanges rate and nominal variables -such as the ination rate, interest
rate, exchange rate, and supply of money. We can study a variety of issues in
monetary economics -the relationship between money and prices, the e¤ects of
ination on equilibrium, and the optimal rate of ination (Walsh 2003, chapter
2). The fundamental question of monetary economics is how we should model
the demand for money. It is also concerned with the conduct monetary policy
in the shadow of the debate Classical and New Keynesians. We deepen subject
of optimal monetary policy in both two sides with take into account adjustment
of prices and wages for closed economy.
On the Classical side, demand for money can be generated by MIU model
where we used Sadrauski (1967) who analyzes the short run e¤ects of monetary
policy and monetary disturbances on real economic activity in the presence
of nominal wage and price rigidities; or CIU model due to Lucas (1982) and
Svensson (1985), Cooley and Hansen (1989 ). Walsh (2003, chapter 3) provides
a detailed description of cash-in-advance models and their implications for the
role of monetary policy. In a word, we face to solve social planner problem
to maximize the utility of representative household for MIU model and attain
Friedman rule is optimal, where nominal interest rate is zero (it = 0) :
Khan, King, and Wolman (2000) consider that If prices are exible, it is
optimal that the nominal interest rate is zero in the presence of Friedman dis-
tortion and cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint. In contrast, price stability would
be optimal in the absence of the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint. With both
sticky prices and the monetary ine¢ ciency, the optimal rate of ination is less
than zero but greater than the zero nominal interest rate. Ination continued
to depend on expected future ination and real marginal cost, but with sticky
wages, real marginal cost can no longer be measured by the gap between the
households marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption and
the marginal product of labor.
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) show that wage stability and price sta-
bility are desirable. Because while wage stability eliminates dispersion of hours
worked across households when both prices and wages are sticky, price stability
eliminates price dispersion across goods. When prices are sticky but wages are
exible, optimal policy should keep the price level stable, in the direct contrary
situation optimal policy should keep nominal wages stable.
On the other side, there exists New Keynesian Model which emphasizes on
the role of monopolistic competition, markups, costly price adjustments (e.g.
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Mankiw and Romer, 1991), and dynamic general equilibrium models where
prices and wages are sticky, that come from the real business cycle literature,
(e.g. Kydland and Prescott,1982; Long and Plosser, 1983; Prescott, 1986).
It basically consists of three components; the expectational IS curve, the
New Keynesian Phillips Curve and a policy rule which formed in a simple way
by Taylor(1993). First component is the expectational IS curve (demand side
of economy) which relates the level of real activity to expected (and sometimes
past) real activity and the real interest rate. Second component is the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve (supply side of economy), represented by a price set-
ting equation. There are two important key improvements while developing the
New Keynesian Phillips Curve; forward-looking behavior in the ination process,
studied by (Friedman,1968; Phelps,1967; Sargent, 1971 and Lucas, 1972,1976)
and the Dixit and Stiglitzs (1977) type of monopolistic model, in the tradition
of Fischer (1977), Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983). Under the assumption of
quadratic costs of price adjustment, Rotemberg (1982) shows that an ination
equation identical to the new Keynesian Phillips curve can be derived. Hairault
and Portier (1993) compared second moment predictions of this assumption in
French and U.S. economies. Finally third component is a simple policy rule
in which the interest rate responds to variations in ination and/or the output
gap. The recent literature focus on monetary rules vs discretion in the pres-
ence of a trade-o¤ between output and ination. Society will generally gain
from commitment and such gains arise even in the absence of a classic ination
bias, i.e. even if the central bank has no desire to push output above its natural
level. That result overturns an implication of the classic Barro-Gordon analysis,
where the gains from commitment arise only if the central bank sets a target
for output that does not correspond to its natural level. We remind that model
does not involve liquidity trap. Taylor (1993) introduced the simple formula
commonly known as the Taylor rule. Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and Clarida,
Galí, and Gertler (2000) estimate alternative versions of the Taylor rule, and
examined its (in)stability over the postwar period. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2006) makes an numerical analysis of the coe¢ cients of the interest rate rule
that satisfy uniqueness of the equilibrium.
If we turn to price and wage adjustment models, we see that apart Svensson
(1986), Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Akerlof
and Yellen (1991) study monopolistic competition and staggered price setting
models, either static, e.g. IS-LM framework, or partial equilibrium; on the other
part Goodfriend and King (1997) discuss the case of price stability. The Calvo
(1983) form of price adjustment has been widely used in analyses of optimal
monetary policy in models with explicit microfoundations (e.g., Goodfriend and
King, 1997; Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford, 2003). Kimball (1995) and Yun
(1996) are the rst to introduce Calvo price setting into stochastic, optimizing-
agent models. King andWolman(1996) provides a detailed analysis of the steady
state and dynamic properties of that model.
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Cooley and Cho (1995) and Bénassy (1995) embedded the assumption of
sticky nominal wages in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, and
examined its implications in the presence of both real and monetary shocks.
Also Huang and Liu (2002) and Woodford (2003, chapter 3) discuss the role of
wage stickiness on the persistence of the monetary shocks. Kim (2000), Smets
and Wouters (2003), and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) study the
staggered wage setting in the context of medium-scale models. Erceg, Henderson
and Levin (2000) developed the new Keynesian model with both staggered price
and staggered wage contracts à la Calvo. Woodford (2003, chapter 6) and
Giannoni and Woodford (2003) nd targeting a weighted average of wage and
price ination is optimal. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) discuss the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks, and
make modications to new Keynesian model to improve the models ability to
match the estimated impulse responses. Galí (1999), Basu, Fernald and Kimball
(2004) generate alternative models to nd the e¤ects of technology shocks and
its implications.
As articulated by Svensson (1999), ....there is considerable agreement among
academics and central bankers that the appropriate loss function both involves
stabilizing ination around an ination target and stabilizing the real economy,
represented by the output gap. Such a loss function forms a key component
of The Science of Monetary Policy (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 1999), and
Woodford (2001a) has shown how it can be derived as an approximation to the
utility of the representative agent.
The optimal policy will seek to strike a balance between stabilization of the
output gap, price ination and wage ination, in which interest rate setting is
a reaction function, responded to the output gap and (expected) ination. An
extensive literature has dealt with optimal monetary policy design in such a
framework in recent years, e.g. Taylor (1999), Svensson (1999), Clarida, Galí
and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003a) and Walsh (2003). Furthermore, as we
generally mentioned at the last part of the thesis, there are contributions about
distortions, not eliminated completely, caused by nominal rigidities in optimal
monetary policy (Gali, 2007,chapter 5). In practice, the optimizing policymaker
will seek to eliminate any distortions that may exist in the economy. Khan, King,
and Wolman (2000) and Woodford (1999c) analyze the role played by distortion
in the design of monetary policy.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out ei-
ther monetary policy history or the relationships and debates between di¤erent
schools of economics. It provides an motivation to see historical improvement
of monetary policy. Section 3 focuses on two di¤erent model; MIU and New
Keynesian Models. Section 4 gives an overlook to optimal monetary policy
presence of mentioned models and investigates the trade-o¤ between discretion
and commitment with/without distortions. Section 5 includes conclusion.
3
2 MONETARY POLICY
Monetary policy is a process by which the government, central bank, or
monetary authority of a country controls the supply of money. This process al-
ways tries to stabilize prices, nancial markets, exchange markets and to obtain
economic growth and fullemployment together. Interest rate, open market oper-
ations, discount rate, reserve requirements and exchange rate are the main tool
of the monetary policy. There are several major macroeconomic models with
di¤erent assumptions that follows di¤erent ways to conduct monetary policy.
We rst discuss the fundamental relationships of Classicals, New Classi-
cals, Keynesians, New Keynesians and Monetarists to recognize the historical
dimension of macroeconomics theory and their monetary policies at the next
subsection.
2.1 History of Monetary Policy
The origin of modern monetary policy came from the classical gold stan-
dard between the years 1880-1914. Under the gold standard all countries would
dene their currencies in terms of a xed weight of gold and then all duciary
money would be convertible into gold. The key role of central banks was to
maintain gold convertibility. The original policy instruments were discount rate
and rediscounting. After the First World War, monetary policy regime shifted
towards at money and focused on stabilizing prices and output in the 1920s.
This trend continued during 1930s and after the Second World War. Through
the Great Depression in 1930s, Classical Economists were generally accepted.
They made their opinion depended on Says Laws where all prices and wages
were exible and self regulated to ensure that the economy operated at the full
employment . Supply created its own demand and saving always equaled to
investment, because changes in the interest rate brought saving and the invest-
ment into equality. These models suggested that there was no need to monetary
or scal policies. In contrast with Classicals, Neoclassical Keynesian argued
that Says Law did not hold because Keyness theory assumed some rigidities
and imperfections in the markets. There were two main models represented by
Neoclassical Keynesians: Hicks IS- LM model (Filho, 1996) and disequilibrium
models. In IS-LM model, Keynesian involuntary unemployment was due to the
existence of the liquidity trap. Hicks formalized the Keynesian and Classical
IS-LM model and considered to be di¤erences from Keynesian and Classical.
The IS curve associated interest rates and income levels in goods market,
while the LM curve presented combinations of interest rates and income levels
along which money market was in equilibrium.
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Classical model Keynesian model
1 M=kl M=L(i,l)
2 Ix=C(i) Ix=C(i)
3 Ix=S(i,l) Ix=S(i)
M: the total quantity of money
k: the Marshall constant in the Cambridge quantity equation,
I: the income level,
Ix: the total investment,
i: interest rate,
S: saving.
The rst equation of each model (Filho,1996), dened the LM curve, while
two other equations dened the IS curve. The introduction of rate of interest in
Keynesian demand for money was not contradictory to the Cambridge Quan-
tity Equation. At each of the model, demand for money depended on income
levels. Consequently, Hicks argued that Keynesian involuntary unemployment
persisted solely because monetary policy could not lower the interest rate suf-
ciently to restore the economy to its full employment income level. As we
mentioned above, among disequilibrium models of Keynesians, the Patinkins
(1956) model analyzed the Keynesian disequilibrium as a result of failure to
obtain short-run exible wages in the labor market. Furthermore, Keynesian
theory could be interpreted as a dynamic disequilibrium analysis of a Walrasian
general equilibrium system in long run.
Barro and Grossman (1971) developed a general disequilibrium model, both
for booms and depressions. The economic system would always respond di¤er-
ently to a specic shock, depend on how prices and wages di¤er from the vector
of prices and wages at fullemployment equilibrium. Benassy and Malinvaud
investigated the microfoundation of disequilibrium macroeconomics to explain
the causes of price and wage rigidities.
Within the Great Depression in 1929, everywhere in the world, increased
chronic ination, unemployment and also diminished production caused under-
employment and demand problems in the markets. Keynessolution - expanding
government spending - worked for short run. When economy fell in recession,
people started to hold money in their hands and rms cut productions. As a
result of this, there were a demand inadequate and unemployment. The govern-
ment had to expand the economy and increased the money supply until people
started to spend money again. If people still held money in their hands, this
time government increased demand by consuming to achieve fullemployment.
By the 1950s and early 1960s, Keynesians used to discretionary scal and
monetary policy to achieve full employment with only moderate amount of ina-
tion, worked seamless to get better the economy. During mid -and late-1960s,
"war on poverty" because of Vietnam furthermore The Arab Oil embargoes
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of the early 1970s resulted in further inationary pressures. This ination,
however, unlike other recent periods of ination, was accompanied by rising
unemployment rates. It came to be known as "stagation" not explained by
simple Keynesian models that were in general use during this period. In ad-
dition, Keynesian did not have a monetary explanation for long run theory of
unemployment. To nd solutions to problems especially stagation for develop-
ment countries, Monetarist and New Classical arose in response to inadequate
of Keynesian Economics. Monetarists claimed that an increase in prices would
not lead to ination unless the government increased the money supply. The
most important factor which directly a¤ected the production, fullemployment
and the general price levels, was money supply. They characterized ination as
a monetary act when the rise in money supply excessed the rise in production.
They found a certain link between the money supply and ination directly. The
AS curve was horizontal to AD in the relation between prices and wages ver-
sus output at fullemployment unlike Keynesian who argued that the AS curve
was vertical to AD. Friedman argued that discretionary policies could have a
short-run e¤ect on the level of output, and government should rely on xed
policy rules, i.e. a long run money growth rules. Main question of Friedman
was limitations of monetary policy. It was related to expectation - augmented
Phillips curve which found a trade-o¤ between rates of ination and unemploy-
ment. According to Friedman, economic agents adapted their expectations in
light of past experience and revised their expectations for each period of time.
Formally the Friedman model could be represented as follows:
P et = f(Pt ) (1)
where Pet was the expected rate of ination in period t.
f1; 2; :::g and Pt  was the rate of ination which occurred in the past.
Equation (1) showed that the economic agents would learn about the in-
ation. Consequently, the expected rate of ination would adjust to equal the
current rate of ination. Friedman rejected the long-run stability of the Phillips
curve because monetary policy could not cause real uctuations in an economy
in long run. To sum up, Friedman and the Monetarists believed that attempts
to lower the rate of unemployment below the "natural" would caused only tem-
porary reductions in unemployment and in long run this situation produced
higher ination along with higher unemployment.
After Keynesian view lost its importance in 1970s, Lucas, Sargent, Wallace
emerged as a distinctive group who relied on the concept of "rational expecta-
tions" i.e. all individuals were rational; rms maximized prots and individuals
maximized utility. They made a strong emphasis on macroeconomy and the
Walrasian general equilibrium framework. Complete and continuous wage and
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price exibility ensured that markets continuously cleared. The quantity of
money should be neutral (Lucas, 1972) and real magnitudes would be indepen-
dent from nominal magnitudes. There was a positive correlation between real
GDP and the nominal price level and the direct contrary relation (negative cor-
relation) between ination and unemployment (Phillips curve). Only relative
prices mattered for optimizing decisions. Thus New Classical Economists came
down on the side of rules in the rules versus discretiondebate over the conduct
of stabilization policy. Under rational expectation model, changes in monetary
policy would only a¤ected the price level but not a¤ected unemployment in short
run. They agreed with Monetarists in supporting a xed monetary policy rule
that reduce unemployment in short run by an unexpectedly large increase in
the money supply, although it caused to make Fed less credible and encouraged
higher future ination. They were criticized because of foundations of their view
which based on Neoclassical Economists whose theory ignored nominality and
didnt try to answer problems of real worlds. Post Keynesians were developed
in a context in which the real world had the following characteristics: (i) money
mattered in both the short-run and long-run, (ii) the future was uncertain, (iii)
contracts were denominated in money terms, (iv) money had two specic prop-
erties di¤erentiated from the other producible goods, and (v) unemployment in
a monetary or entrepreneurial economy, i.e. an economy in which uctuations
of e¤ective demand were explained as a monetary phenomenon, was a normal
result. Keyness analysis was developed on three theoretical propositions: the
theory of income determination (propensity to consume and multiplier), the
theory of investment (marginal e¢ ciency of capital), and the theory of interest
rate (liquidity preference). The Hicksian interpretation of GT provided some
logical misunderstandings of Keyness theory. For example, (i) it substituted
the Walrasian system of general equilibrium for Keyness Marshall equilibrium;
(ii) it dichotomized the real and monetary markets; and (iii) it did not analyze
the role that expectation and uncertainty had on e¤ective demand.
2.2 Discretion versus Rules
While searching optimal monetary policy, we need some knowledge how
we associate the tools of monetary policy as a rule. And we investigate the
optimal rules according to its historical development and their implications in
this subsection.
At the beginning of the 1960s, central banks should achieve multiple social
objectives: low ination, high growth, low unemployment and low nominal in-
terest rates. In addition, the Federal Reserve was expected to contribute to
specic exports such as encouraging balanced payments with the rest of the
world and a strong housing sector.
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Monetary policy aspect interest rates, who made or lost money from its
uctuations. Therefore, the markets constantly tried to do forecasting. In the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, economists were precise about the nature of
the connection between money and the general price level. Irving Fisher, among
others, made important contributions to monetary theory long before the Great
Depression. This idea the general price level and its rate of increase depended
primarily on the level of the money stock and its rate of increase fell out of
favor with the rise of Keynesian analysis in the 1930s and 1940s. The idea was
revived in the 1950s by Milton Friedman who focused ination. The Friedman
Rule was dened as the zero nominal interest rate with a deation rate at time
preference rate. However, the optimality of Friedman rule was criticized within
common usage of ination targeting as a monetary policy, which preferred to
use low and positive ination rate instead of a given deation rate. Phelps
(1973 ) rst showed that the Friedman Rule was not optimal in the frame of
Ramseys (1927) optimal taxation by implicating the ination, and argued that
a positive nominal ination rate was optimal when the elasticity of interest was
low. Aganist to Friedman (1969) who discussed the subject of optimal interest
rate in a rst optimal equilibrium condition, Phelps took it consideration within
the optimal taxation in a second optimal equilibrium condition. According to
Phelps, Friedman ignored the scal e¢ ciency. Furthermore in direct contraction
to Friedman, Phelps handled a situation that government spending is met by
diversionary (non-lumpsum, NLS) tax. Finally, while Friedman determines the
optimal quantity of money by excluding nance of the public and decision of
private sectors consumption and leisure in a partial equilibrium model, Phelps
under the optimal taxation approach, determined optimal ination rate in a
general equilibrium model. Within Lucas and Stokey (1983), who carried the
Ramseys normative policy determination approach into dynamic environment,
determination of optimal monetary policies were possible in short run. Allan
Meltzer and Bennett McCallum had worked on variants of the Friedman rule.
These were quantity-based rules that yielded a change in growth rate of the
money stock or in monetary base.
Another rule which we wanted to discuss is an interest rate rule, proposed
by Stanford economist John Taylor in 1993. The Taylor rule pointed out how
a central bank should adjust its interest rate as an policy instrument which
responded to real output and ination rate.
The Taylor Rule:
i  i = (   ) + q(q   q) (2)
where i was the short term nominal interest rate.
i was a baseline path in proportion to deviations of target variables which
are nominal income while the other targeted ination and real output.
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Taylor (1999b) emphasized that the coe¢ cient of ination deviation was
greater than 1. If the coe¢ cient was below 1, then an increase in ination would
call for an increase in the nominal interest rate that was smaller than an increase
in ination. Besides this, the interest rate is rising when the coe¢ cient of output
deviation is rising. Taylor developed a "hypothetical but representative policy
rule" (p. 214) by using the sum of the equilibrium or natural rate of interest,
r, and ination, , for i and setting the ination target and equilibrium real
interest equal to two and the response parameters to one half. The result was
what became known as the classic Taylor rule:
i = 2 +  +
1
2
(   2) + 1
2
(q   q) (3)
The stabilization properties of this rule and its usefulness for understand-
ing historical monetary policy in a period generally accepted by central banks
to provide guidance in policy decisions. By linking interest rate decisions di-
rectly to ination and economic activity, Taylor rules o¤ered a convenient tool
for studying monetary policy while abstracting from a detailed analysis of the
demand and supply of money. This allowed the development of simpler models
(see the survey in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999 and papers in Taylor, 1999)
and the replacement of the "LM curve" with a Taylor rule in treatments of the
Hicksian IS-LM apparatus. (It should be noted, however, that this abstraction
was overly simplistic when the short-term interest rate approached zero. At
the zero bound, the stance of monetary policy could no longer be measured or
communicated with a short-term interest rate instrument; (see, for example,
Orphanides and Wieland 2000). Subsequent research (see Orphanides, 2003b,
for a survey) suggested that a generalized form of Taylors classic rule could
provide a useful common basis both for econometric policy evaluation across di-
verse families of models and for historical monetary policy analysis over a broad
range of experience.
If we compare these two rule (Friedman and Taylor) under assumption of
constant growth of money supply, we had Taylor Rule could be derived from the
quantity equation (MV=PQ) (Taylor 1999c). Therefore interest rate uctuated
where the coe¢ cient of output and ination deviation were turning out positive.
3 THE MODEL
In this section we construct two general models (MIU model and New Key-
nesian model) which start with exible wage and price contracts then maintain
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with rigidities of wage and prices. In the rst subsection, utility depends di-
rectly on agentsconsumption of goods and their holdings of money. (Money is
seen in the budget constraint and utility function in the form of the real money
balances.) Then we turn to models under the price of nominal rigidities in which
monetary policy and monetary disturbances have important short run e¤ects
on real economy. Nominal wages or price rigidities mean that they fail to adjust
immediately and completely to changes in the nominal quantity of money, is
used to describe the short run real e¤ects of monetary disturbances. We discuss
why the price stickiness is important that the change in price rate a¤ects the
rate of ination and what we gain in a manner of monetary policy by analyzing
New Keynesian Model which allows that wages and prices are sticky together.
3.1 MIU Model
3.1.1 Flexible Wages and Prices
We will ignore uncertainty and any labor leisure choice focusing instead on
the implications of the model for money demand, the value of money, and the
costs of ination. When money enters the utility, it helps to reduce the time
needed to purchase consumption goods.
Utility of the representative household takes the form without money
Ut = u(ct; zt) (4)
zt is the ow of services yielded by money holding
ct is time t per capita consumption.
Utility is strictly concave and continuously di¤erentiable.
The demand for monetary services will always be positive if assuming that
limz!0 uz(c; z) = 1 for all c, where uz = @u(c; z)=@z equal real per capita
money holdings:
zt = MtPtNt  mt:
To ensure that a monetary equilibrium exists, it is often assumed that, for all
c, there exists a nite m >0 such that um(c;m)  0 for all m>m: This means
that the marginal utility of money eventually becomes negative for su¢ ciently
high money balances. The role of this assumption will be made clear when a
steady state exists.
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The representative household total utility
W =
1X
t=0
tu(ct;mt); (5)
where 0< < 1 is a subjective rate of discount.
Household can hold money, that bonds pay a nominal interest rate it, and
physical capital. Physical capital produces output according to a standard neo-
classical production function. Given its current income, its assets, and any net
transfers received from the government ( t).
The household allocates its resources between consumption, gross investment
in physical capital, and gross accumulation of real money balances and bonds.
If the rate of depreciation of physical capital is , the aggregate economy-wide
budget constraint of the household sector takes form:
Yt+  tNt+(1  )Kt 1+ (1 + it 1)Bt 1
Pt
+
Mt 1
Pt
= Ct+Kt+
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
(6)
where Yt is aggregate output
Kt 1 is aggregate stock of capital at the start of period t,
 tNt is the aggregate real value of any lump-sum transfers (taxes if negative).
The aggregate production function
Yt = F (Kt 1;Nt) (7)
where Yt is output
Kt 1 is the available capital stock
Nt is employment
The production function is homogeneous with constant returns to scale,
and output per capita at time t will be a function of per capita capital stock:
yt = f(
kt 1
1+n );
n is the constant population growth rate
Output is produced in period t using capital carried over from period t-1.
The production function is assumed to continuously di¤erentiable and to
satisfy the usual Inada conditions: (fk  0; fkk  0; limk!1 fk(k) = 0).
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Now we divide the both sides of the budget constraint (6) by the population
Nt; per capita version becomes
!t  f( kt 1
1 + n
)+  t+(
1  
1 + n
)kt 1+
(1  it 1)bt 1 +mt 1
(1 + t)(1 + n)
= ct+kt+mt+ bt;
(8)
where  t is the rate for ination,
bt= BtDtNt
mt = MtPtNt ;
The households problem maximize (5) subject to (6). This problem is a
problem in dynamic optimization,(Sargent, 1987; Lucas and Stokey 1989; Dixit
1990; Chiang 1992; Obsteld and Rogo¤,1996 or Ljungquist and Sargent, 2000).
We rearrange (5) as a value function dene as the present discounted value of
utility if the household optimally chooses consumption, capital holdings, bond
holdings, and money balances,
V (!t) = maxfu(ct;mt) + V (!t+1)g (9)
where the maximization is subject to the budget constraint (6) and
!t+1  f(kt)
1 + n
+  t+1 + (
1  
1 + n
)kt +
(1  it)bt +mt
(1 + t+1)(1 + n)
(10)
using (8) to express kt = !t   ct  mt   bt and making use of the denition
of !t+1; can be written as
V (!t) = maxfu(ct;mt)+V (f(!t   ct  mt   bt)
1 + n
+ t+1+(
1  
1 + n
)(!t ct mt bt)+ (1  it)bt +mt
(1 + t+1)(1 + n)
)g
(11)
unconstrained one over ct;mt and bt:
As a result, we have Fisher relationship (Fisher, 1896) which equates the
nominal interest rate to the real interest rate plus the expected rate of ination
12
and money demand, a positive function of consumption also a negative function
interest rate from the rst order conditions (see details from Walsh 2003, p. 50).
it = rt + t+1 (12)
mt = '(ct; it) (13)
where ' is a money depend function.
We can calculate the steady-stade value of mt from the money demand
relationship
um(ct;mt)
uc(ct;mt)
=
i
1 + i
(14)
where um(ct;mt) is the rst derivative of the utility function respects to mt;
uc(ct;mt) is the rst derivative of the utility function respects to ct;
and Ct = Yt
In the model as we mentioned above, money is either neutral and superneu-
tral in the steady-state where neutrality means that changes in the level of M
do not a¤ect real variables: C = Y where Y is exogenously given and does not
depend on M. Furthermore, superneutrality of money means that the steady-
state values of real variables are all independent of the rate of ination (and
the rate of monetary growth). In the steady state nominal rate of interest is
given by [(1 + )=]   1 and varies approximately one for one with ination.
Outside of the steady state, the nominal rate can still be written as the sum of
the expected real rate plus the expected rate of ination, but there is no longer
any presumption that short-run variations in ination will leave the real rate
una¤ected.
MIU model (Sdrauski, 1967) lets us examine the welfare cost of ination and
determine the optimal ination rate. Friedman conclusion is that the ination
rate is optimal when it produces the zero rate of nominal interest rate.
About the welfare cost of ination, money holdings yield direct utility and
higher ination reduces real money balances, as a result, ination generates a
welfare loss. The question we will try to answer is whether there is an optimal
rate of ination that maximizes the steady-state welfare of the representative
household or not. Government chooses its policy instrument  to achieve the
steady-state optimal value of M=P.
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Lucas (1972) simplies the same MIU model, we used, to illustrate how
variations in the nominal quantity of money can have real e¤ects when the
information is imperfect. First capital is ignored. Second there is only money
as an available asset. Finally, agents view the monetary transfers associated
with changes in the nominal quantity of money.
Lucass basic result is that aggregate monetary shocks have real e¤ects on
employment (and therefore output) if and only if there is an imperfect informa-
tion. Contrast to publicly announced changes, i.e. predictable changes, in the
money supply, unanticipated changes have real e¤ects on output.
In most works in monetary economics imperfect information no longer plays
a major role as the source of monetary nonneutrality. Instead, the assumption
of exible prices is dropped and prices and/or wages are assumed to be sticky.
3.1.2 Staggered Price and Wage Adjustments
Now we can clearly see in this subsection that how we put price rigidities
into a model. Several authors have argued that nominal rigidities arise because
of small menu costs, essentially xed costs, associated with changing wages or
prices. Mankiw, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) show that small costs of changing
prices "menu costs" produce large nominal rigidities. Any sort of nominal rigid-
ity naturally raises the question of who is setting wages and prices. Once we
need to address the issue of price setting, we must examine the model that
incorporate some aspect of imperfect competition, such as monopolistic com-
petition. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) introduce price stickiness into
their model by following Taylor (1979, 1980), who argued that an unexpected,
permanent increase in the nominal money supply produces a rise in output with
a slow adjustment and a gradual rise in the price level as a symmetry according
to a horizontal line response to price level and output(Walsh ,2003: Figure 5.1,
p.222). Though the model assumes that prices are set for only two periods, the
money shock leads to a persistent, long-lasting e¤ect on output. Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan assume that employment must be consistent with household
labor supply choices, and they show that  i.e. it depends on the elasticity of
labor supply with respect to the real wage, is a function of the parameters of
the representative agents utility function. They argue that a very high labor-
supply elasticity is required to obtain a value of  on the order of 0.05. With
a low labor-supply elasticity, as seems more plausible,  will be greater than or
equal to 1. If this is the case, the Taylor model is not capable of capturing real-
istic adjustment to monetary shocks. Ascari (2000) reaches similar conclusions
in a model that is similar to the framework in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2000) but that follows Taylors original work in making wages sticky rather
than prices.
14
As a price-level adjustment models Taylor (1979, 1980), Calvo (1983), and
Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) are developed by Roberts (1995). Taylor (1979,
1980) originally developed his model in terms of nominal wage-setting behavior.
With prices assumed to be a constant markup over wage costs, the adjustment
of wages translates directly into an adjustment equation for prices. In the
Fuhrer-Moore (1995a) specication, the backward-looking nature of the ination
process implies that reductions in the growth rate of money will be costly in
terms of output. They argue that their specication ts U.S. data better than
the Taylor model does. There are two reason while we are choosing Calvos
model in detail. First it shows how the coe¢ cient on output in the ination
equation depends on the frequency with which prices are adjusted. A rise in !,
causes [ (1 !)(1 !)! ] to decrease. Output movements have a smaller impact on
current ination, holding expected future ination constant. Second reason is
we use this model in New Keynesian model.
Here we mention the price adjustment model which based on Calvo (1983)
who assumes that rms adjust their prices infrequently and that opportunity of
adjusting prices occurs randomly. Besides, we can construct our model taking
into consideration only wage rigidity as shown below.
Calvo Model (1983)
Calvo assumes that rms adjust their prices infrequently and that op-
portunities to adjust arrived as an exogenous Possion process. Each period,
there is a constant probability 1-! that rm can adjust its price; the expected
time between price adjustments is 1/(1-!). Because these adjustment opportu-
nities occur randomly, the interval between price changes for an individual rm
is a random variable. Following Rotemberg (1987), suppose the representative
rm i sets its price to minimize a quadratic loss function that depends on the
di¤erence between the rms actual price in period t, pit;and its optimal price,
pt . This latter price might denote the prot- maximizing price for rm i in the
absence of any restrictions or costs associated with price adjustment. If the rm
can adjust at time t, it will set its price to minimize
1
2
Et
1X
j=0
i(pit+j   pt+j)2 (15)
subject to the assumed process for determining when the rm will next be
able to adjust. Equation becomes
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1X
j=0
!iiEt(pit   pt+j)2 (16)
!i is the probability that the rm has not adjusted after i periods so that
the price set at t still holds in t+i.
xt denote the optimal price set at t by all rms adjusting their prices:
xt = (1  !)
1X
j=0
!iiEtp

t+i (17)
(17) is written again
xt = (1  !)pt + !Etxt+i (18)
The price set by the rm at time t is a weighted average of current and
expected future values of the target price p depends on the aggregate price
level and output, we can replace pt with pt + yt + "t; where " is a random
disturbance to capture other determinants of p:the rms optimal price will be
shown to be a function of its marginal cost, which in turn, can be expressed as
pt = (1  !)xt + !pt 1 (19)
To obtain an expression for aggregate ination,
t = pt   pt 1 (20)
t = Ett+1 + [
(1  !)(1  !)
!
](yt + "t) = Ett+1 + 
0
yt + "t (21)
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Wage Rigidity
Here we construct our model with wage rigidity. First we take a exible-
price MIU model (Walsh, 2003, chapter 5) in which households prefer to adjust
their prices every period.
Utility of the representative household takes the form
Ut = u(ct; zt) (22)
zt is the ow of services yielded by money holding
ct is time t per capita consumption.
Utility is strictly concave and continuously di¤erentiable.
The demand for monetary services will always be positive if assuming that
limz!0 uz(c; z) = 1 for all c, where uz = @u(c; z)=@z equal real per capita
money holdings: zt = MtPtNt  mt:
To ensure that a monetary equilibrium exists, it is often assumed that, for all
c, there exists a nite m >0 such that um(c;m)  0 for all m>m: This means
that the marginal utility of money eventually becomes negative for su¢ ciently
high money balances. The role of this assumption will be made clear when a
steady state exists.
The representative household total utility
W =
1X
t=0
tu(ct;mt); (23)
where 0< < 1 is a subjective rate of discount.
Household can hold money, that bonds pay a nominal interest rate it, and
physical capital. Physical capital produces output according to a standard neo-
classical production function.
Given its current income, its assets, and any net transfers received from the
government ( t).
The household allocates its resources between consumption, gross investment
in physical capital, and gross accumulation of real money balances and bonds.
If the rate of depreciation of physical capital is , the aggregate economy-wide
budget constraint of the household sector takes form:
Yt+  tNt+(1  )Kt 1+ (1 + it 1)Bt 1
Pt
+
Mt 1
Pt
= Ct+Kt+
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
(24)
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where Yt is aggregate output
Kt 1 is aggregate stock of capital at the start of period t,
 tNt is the aggregate real value of any lump-sum transfers (taxes if negative).
The aggregate production function
Yt = F (Kt 1;Nt) (25)
where Yt is output
Kt 1 is the available capital stock
Nt is employment
The production function is homogeneous with constant returns to scale,
and output per capita at time t will be a function of per capita capital stock:
yt = f(
kt 1
1+n );
n is the constant population growth rate
Output is produced in period t using capital carried over from period t-1.
The production function is assumed to continuously di¤erentiable and to
satisfy the usual Inada conditions: (fk  0; fkk  0; limk!1 fk(k) = 0).
Now we divide the both sides of the budget constraint (24) by the population
Nt; per capita version becomes
!t  f( kt 1
1 + n
)+  t+(
1  
1 + n
)kt 1+
(1  it 1)bt 1 +mt 1
(1 + t)(1 + n)
= ct+kt+mt+ bt;
(26)
where  t is the rate for ination,
bt= BtDtNt and mt =
Mt
PtNt
;
The households problem maximize (23) subject to (24). We rearrange (23)
as a value function dened as the present discounted value of utility if the
household optimally chooses consumption, capital holdings, bond holdings, and
money balances,
V (!t) = maxfu(ct;mt) + V (!t+1)g (27)
where the maximization is subject to the budget constraint (24) and
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!t+1  f(kt)
1 + n
+  t+1 + (
1  
1 + n
)kt +
(1  it)bt +mt
(1 + t+1)(1 + n)
(28)
using (26) to express kt = !t  ct mt  bt and making use of the denition
of !t+1;can be written as
V (!t) = maxfu(ct;mt)+V (f(!t   ct  mt   bt)
1 + n
+ t+1+(
1  
1 + n
)(!t ct mt bt)+ (1  it)bt +mt
(1 + t+1)(1 + n)
)g
(29)
unconstrained one over ct;mt and bt:
The MIU model focuses on steady state properties. Now we are interested
in understanding the implications of the model for the dynamic process the
economy follows as it adjust in response to exogenous disturbances. From the
linearization we have eight equations that have solved for capital stock, money
holdings, output, consumption, employment, the real rate of interest, the nom-
inal interest rate, and the ination rate.
The equations are written in terms:
yt = (1  )nt + zt (30)
yt = ct (31)
yt   nt = wt   pt (32)
Et[
(ct+1   ct)  rt = 0 (33)
wt   pt = ( n
ss
1  nss )nt +ct (34)
mt   pt = ct   (1
b
)it (35)
it = rt + Etpt+1   pt (36)
19
mt = mt 1 + st (37)
The system is written in terms of the price level p rather than the ination
rate. m represents the nominal stock of money. (30) represents the production
function in which output deviations from the steady state are a linear function
of the deviations of labor supply from the steady state and a productivity shock.
(31) represent the resource constraint derived from the condition that, in the
absence of investment or government purchases. Labor demand is derived from
the condition that labor is employed up to the point where the marginal product
of labor equals the real wage. (32) derived from the Cobb- Douglas production
function is written in terms of percentage deviations from the steady state. (33)
and (34) are derived from the representative households rst order conditions
for consumption, leisure, and money holdings. (34) is the Fisher equation linking
the nominal and real rates of interest. (35) gives the exogenous process for the
nominal money supply. (30) and (34) form a system of equations that can be
solved for the equilibrium time paths of output, labor, consumption, the real
wage,and the real rate of interest when the prices are exible. (35) and (37)
determine the evolution of real money balances, the nominal interest rate, and
the price level. The monetary disturbance st have no e¤ect on output when
prices are exible.
A linear approximation was used to examine the time-series implications of
an MIU model. Wages and prices were assumed to adjust to ensure market
equilibrium,and, as a consequence, the behavior of the money supply mattered
only to the extent that anticipated ination was a¤ected. A positive disturbance
to the growth rate of money would, assuming that the growth rate of money
was positively serially correlated, raise the expected rate of ination, leading
to a rise in the nominal rate of interest that a¤ects labor supply and output.
These last e¤ects depended on the form of the utility function; if utility was
separable in money, changes in expected ination had no a¤ect on labor supply
or real output. We modify the model as we mentioned above by adding a one
period nominal wage rigidity to illustrate the e¤ect on the impact of monetary
disturbances. Since workers and rms are assumed to have a real wage target
in mind, the nominal wage will adjust fully to reect expectations of price-
level changes held at the time the nominal wage is set. The equilibrium level
of employment and real wage with exible prices can be obtained by equating
labor supply and labor demand. From (30), (31), (32) and (34), we obtain,
nt = [
1  
1 +  + (1  )(  1) ]zt = b0zt (38)
and
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!t = [
 +
1 +  + (1  )(  1) ]zt = b1zt (39)
where  is the ex-price equilibrium employment,
! is the ex-price equilibrium real wage,
  nss=(1  nss) (40)
The contract nominal wage wc will satisfy
wct  Et 1!t + Et 1pt (41)
using production function then we have
Et 1!t =  Et 1nt + Et 1zt (42)
nt = Et 1nt + (
1

)(pt   Et 1pt) + ( 1

)"t (43)
where "t  (zt   Et 1zt)
(42) shows that employment deviates from the expected exible price equi-
librium level in the face of unexpected movements in prices. An unanticipated
increase in prices reduces the real value of the contract wage and leads rms to
expand employment. An unaccepted productivity shock "t raises the marginal
product of labor and leads to an employment increase. If prices are unexpect-
edly low, the actual real wage will exceed the level expected to clear the labor
market, and rms will reduce employment. By substituting (42) into production
function we obtain
yt = (1  )[Et 1nt + (
1

)(pt   Et 1pt) + ( 1

)"t] + et (44)
which implies that
yt   Et 1yt = a(pt   Et 1pt) + (1 + a)"t (45)
where Et 1y = (1   )Et 1nt + Et 1zt is expected equilibrium output
under exible prices and a=1  :
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Innovations to output are positively related to price innovations. Thus mon-
etary shocks that produce unanticipated price movements directly a¤ect real
output. Imperfect competition can lead to aggregate demand externalities,
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), equilibria in which output is ine¢ ciently low,
and multiple equilibria (Ball and Romer 1991, Rotemberg and Woodford 1995)
but it alone does not lead to monetary nonneutrality. If prices are free to ad-
just one period, permanent changes in the level of the money supply induce
proportional changes in all prices, leaving the real equilibrium una¤ected. Now
we add price stickiness by assuming that intermediate goods producers engage
in multi-period, staggered price setting. After we explain what staggered wage
and price adjustment mean, we will see New Keynesian Model wherein both
wages and prices are staggered.
3.2 A New Keynesian Model
The second model is New Keynesian Model (i.e. both of prices and wages
are sticky) whose elements are nominal rigidities and imperfect competition in
a dynamic general equilibrium models. Equilibrium conditions for aggregate
variables are derived from optimal individual behavior on the part of consumers
and rms, and are consistent with the simultaneous clearing of all markets.
Before New Keynesian economics, DGE models largely relate to Real Business
Cycle paradigm which analyzes the relation between money, ination, and the
business cycle.
The name "New Keynesian Theory" is rst introduced by Michael Parkin
(1982). One of the earliest using of the term "New Keynesian Economics" is in
article by Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988). New is used instead of "Neo" to dis-
tinguish from "Neoclassical Synthesis Keynesian Economics" and also to show
that it is the counter- argument to the New Classical Economics. The foun-
dations of the Keynesian Economics are usually attributed in Stanley Fischer,
Edmund Phelps, and John Taylor.
We prefer to study with New Keynesian models to provide a tractable frame-
work for analysis of optimal monetary policy design for a closed economy. Opti-
mality tells us the perspective of representative agents -household or consumer -
utility function. We suppose that objective of monetary authority, central bank
or government, sets policy to maximize the utility of the representative agents
or to minimize the loss function. The fundamental assumptions of this model
concern who the agents are, their preferences and endowments, the technology
which they have accessed, and the market structure.
The problem setup:
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1-Specify how households make optimal choices
2-Specify how rms make optimal choices and how production occurs.
3-Consider simultaneously the optimal choices of both households and rms
along the resource constraint of the economy.
4-Together setup the equilibrium of the economy.
5-Evaluate the welfare of any given policy by simply inserting the resulting
equilibrium levels of consumption (and/or leisure) into the representative agents
utility functions.
The New Keynesian models bring a new perspective on the nature of ina-
tion dynamics, the concept of output gap, the form of the working of policy
instruments. In addition to being a source of monetary non-neutralities, the
presence of sticky prices may also have implications for the economys response
to non monetary shocks. Optimal monetary policy requires that the central
bank respond to a simple policy rule that has the central bank adjusted (su¢ -
ciently) the interest rate in response to variations in ination. The output gap
generally provides a good approximation to the optimal rule (with the implied
welfare losses being small). The coexistence of staggered price setting has im-
portant implications for monetary policy. An extensive literature has dealt with
optimal monetary policy design in such a framework in recent years, e.g. Taylor
(1999), Svensson (1999), Clarida Gali and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003a)
and Walsh (2003).
As Walsh (2006) noted: Today . . . [c]entral banks employ DSGE models
for policy analysis. Policy makers think in terms of rules. They recognize the
value of credibility and commitment. They try to reduce uncertainty in markets
by providing information about the likely future path of interest rates... ".
3.2.1 Model Description
The model consists of household and rms. Household supply labor, pur-
chases goods for consumption, and hold money and bonds. Firms hire labor,
produce and sell di¤erentiated products in monopolistically competitive goods
markets. The basic model of monopolistic competition is drawn from Dixit and
Striglitz (1977). Each rm sets the price of the good it produces, but not all
rms reset their price in each period. Households and rms behave optimally;
households maximize the expected present value of utility, and rms maximize
the prots. There is also a central bank who controls the nominal rate of inter-
est. The central bank, in contrast to households and rms, is not assumed to
behave optimally.
The preferences of representative household are dened over a composite
consumption good Ct;
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Real money balances MtPt ;
Leisure 1-Nt; where Nt is the time devotes to market employment.
Households maximize the expected present discounted value of utility:
Et
1X
i=0
i[
C1 i+i
1   +

1  b (
Mt+i
Pt+i
)1 b   N
1+
t+i
1 + 
] (46)
The composite consumption good consists of di¤erentiated products produce
by monopolistically competitive nal goods producers (rms). The composite
consumption good which enters the households utility function
Ct = [
1Z
0
c
 1

jt dj]

 1 (47)
where  > 1 and  govern the price elasticity of demand for the individ-
ual goods. The household rst minimizes the cost of the composite good, then
given the cost of achieving any given level of Ct, choose Ct; Nt; and Mt opti-
mally. Dealing rst with the problem of minimizing the cost of buying Ct, the
households decision problem is to
mincjt
Z
pjtcjtdj (48)
subjects to
[
1Z
0
c
 1

jt dj]

 1 > Ct (49)
where pjt is the price of good j and the consumption index given by Ct:
Aggregated price index for consumption:
Pt  [
1Z
0
p1 jt dj]
1
1  (50)
the demand for good j can be written as
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cjt = (
pjt
Pt
) Ct (51)
The price elasticity of demand for good j is equal to : As  ! 1; the
individual goods become closer and closer substitutes, and, as a consequence,
individual rms have less market power.
Given the denition of the aggregate price index, the budget constraint of
the household is in real terms,
Ct +
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
= (
Wt
Pt
)Nt +
Mt 1
Pt
+ (1 + it 1)(
Bt 1
Pt
) + t (52)
where Mt(Bt) was the households nominal holdings of money (one-period
bonds).
it : Nominal interest rate paid for bonds.
t : Real prots received from rms.
Now we maximize the households utility (46) subject to budget constraint
(52). The Euler Conditions where the budget constraint (52) has to hold in
equilibrium.
Optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption
C t = (1 + it)Et(
Pt
Pt+1
)C t+1; (53)
The marginal rate of substitution between money and consumption equal to
the opportunity cost of holding money.
(MtPt )
 b
C t
=
it
1 + it
(54)
The marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption equal to
the real wage.
Nt
C t
=
Wt
Pt
(55)
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:
Firms maximize prots, subject to production function summarizing the
available technology, demand curve each rm faces, and the price stickiness due
to Calvo(1983). The other price adjustment models are state dependent pricing
models (Dotsey, King and Wolman, 1999; Kiley ,2000) and endogenous price
stickiness model (Haubrich and King,1991).
Before the rms pricing decision, we minimize its cost
minNt(
Wt
Pt
)Nt + 't(cjt   ZtNjt) (56)
where 't is rms real marginal cost: 't =
Wt=Pt
Zt
:
then we return to the pricing decision problem
Et
1X
i=0
!it;t+i[(
pjt
Pt+i
)1    't+i(
pjt
Pt+i
) ]Ct+i (57)
where t;t+i = 
i(Ct+i=Ct)
  is the discount factor
Individual rms who produce di¤erentiated products, all have the same pro-
duction technology and face demand curves with constant and equal demand
elasticities. Let p the optimal price is chosen by all rms adjusting at time t
and the denition of the discount factor we obtain
(
pt
Pt
) = (

   1)
Et
1X
i=0
!iiC1 t+i 't+1(
Pt+i
Pt
)
Et
1X
i=0
!iiC1 t+i (
Pt+i
Pt
) 1
(58)
If ! = 0; all rms are able to adjust their prices every period then, (58)
reduces to (59).
(
pt
Pt
) = (

   1)'t = 't (59)
In a standard monopolistic competition model, each rm sets its price pt
equal to a markup  > 1 over its nominal marginal cost Pt't. When prices are
exible, all rms charge the same price. In this case pt=Pt and 't = 1=:
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Using the denition of real marginal cost ('t), we have
Wt
Pt
=
Zt

(60)
in a exible- price equilibrium. However, the real wage has to also equal the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption to be consistent
with household optimization. From (55)
Wt
Pt
=
Zt

=
Nt
C t
(61)
Around the steady state:
bnft + bcft = bzt (62)
byft = bnft + bzt (63)
byft = bcft : (64)
where the superscript f denotes the exible-price equilibrium. Combining
(62), (63), (64) the exible price equilibrium output byft can be expressed as
byft = ( 1 +  +  )bzt (65)
when prices are sticky (w>0), output can di¤er from the exible-price equi-
librium level. Because it will not adjust its price every period. The aggregate
price index is an average of the price charged by the fraction 1-! of rms setting
their price in period t and the average of the remaining fraction ! of all rms
setting their price in earlier periods.
The average price in period t satises
P 1 t = (1  !)(pt )1  + !P 1 t 1 (66)
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aggregate ination is obtained from (58) and (66) by approximating around
a zero average ination at a steady-state equilibrium
t = Ett+1 + eb't (67)
where e = (1 !)(1 !)! is an increasing function of the fraction of rms able
to adjust each period.b't is real marginal cost, expressed as a percentage deviation around its
steady-state value.
(67) is often referred to as the New Keynesian Phillips Curve. It implies
that the ination process is forward-looking with current ination as a function
of expected future ination. When a rm sets its price, it has to be concerned
with ination in future because it may be unable to adjust its price for several
periods. Solving (67) forward, we have t = b 1X
i=0
iEtb't+i; which shows that
ination is a function of the present discounted value of current and future real
marginal costs. (67) implies that ination depends on real marginal cost and
not directly on a measure of the output gap between actual and potential output
or on a measure of unemployment relative to the natural rate, as in typical in
traditional Phillips curves. The rms real marginal cost equals the real wage
divides by the marginal product of labor. In a exible price equilibrium, all
rms set the same price so the real marginal cost will equal its steady state
value 1/: Because nominal wages have been assumed to be completely exible,
the real wage has to equal the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption. Expressed in terms of percentage deviations of marginal cost
around its the steady state (55) implies that
cwt   bpt = bnt + byt: (68)
Recalling that bct = byt and byt = bnt + bzt; (68) becomes
b't = ( bwt   bpt)  (byt   bnt) = ( + )[byt   ( 1 +  +  )bzt] (69)
But from (65), this can be written as
b't = (byt   byft ) (70)
where  =  + . Using this result, the ination adjustment equation (67)
becomes
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t = Ett+1 + xt (71)
where  = e = (1   !)(1   !)=! and xt  byt   byft is the output gap
between actual output and exible- price equilibrium output.
Each rms production function under the assumption of existence of con-
stant return to scale (0<a 1) is
cjt = ZtN
a
jt (72)
where 0<a 1;
When a<1, rms with di¤erent production function levels face di¤erent mar-
ginal cost is derived in terms of deviations around the steady-state for rm j
is
b'jt = b't   [(1  a)a ](bpjt   bpt) (73)
Firms with relatively high prices (and therefore low output ) have relatively
low real marginal costs.
In the case of constant returns scale (a=1), all rms face the same marginal
cost. According to Sbordone (2002) and Gali, Gertler,and Lopez-Salido (2001),
the New Keynesian ination adjustment equation is
t = Ett+1 + e[ a
a+ (1  a) ]b't (74)
The labor market equilibrium condition under exible prices:
Wt
Pt
=
aZtN
a 1
t

=
Nt
C t
and exible-price output is
byft = [ 1 + 1 +  + a(   1) ]bzt: (75)
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when a=1, this reduces to (65).
(71) relates output, in the form of the deviation around the level of out-
put that will occur in the absence of nominal price rigidity, to ination and a
linearized version of the households Euler condition (53). They form key com-
ponents of an optimizing model that can be used for monetary policy analysis.
Esteralla and Fuhrer (2002) write the ination adjustment equation (71)
as Ett+1   t =  xt: If we let ut+1 denote the error in forecasting future
ination, this can be written as t+1   t =  xt + (t+1   Ett+1) =
 xt + ut+1: Since   1 in quarterly data according to U.S. data, t+1  
t     xt + ut+1: An increase in the output gap should lead to a fall in
future ination. Unemployment is direct proportion with ination. (71) doesnt
successful to t with quarterly U.S. data. The estimated coe¢ cient on the
gap measure in quarterly U.S. data is actually negative (Gali and Getler, 1999;
Sbordone 2001), although Roberts (1995) found a small positive coe¢ cient using
annual data. Fuhrer (1997b) nds little role for future ination once lagged
ination is added to the ination adjustment equation under the persistence
ination. Gali and Gertler (1999) test model of ination adjustment by using
real marginal cost rather than using an output gap variable. They conclude
that lagged ination is much less important than suggested by Rudebusch and
Fuhrer if real marginal cost is used in place of an output gap measure. Sbordone
(2002) also implies that there is a dependence of ination on expected future
ination and real marginal cost. These results suggest that the problem is the
link between marginal cost and output rather than the link between marginal
cost and ination.
3.2.2 General Equilibrium
(53), (58) and (66) provide to determine output, nominal quantity of money
in equilibrium and the aggregate price level depends on the nominal rate of
interest.
xt = Etxt+1   ( 1

)(bit   Ett+1) + ut (76)
(76) represented the demand side of the economy which was expectational,
fordward-looking IS curve and where ut  Etbyft+1   byft depended only on
the exogenous productivity disturbance. New Keynesian Phillips Curve (71)
corresponded to the supply side derived from the pricing decisions of individual
rm. Combining (76) with (71) gave a simple two equation, forward-looking,
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rational-expectations model for ination and the output gap measure xt: (71)
and (76) contained the output gap, ination, and the nominal interest rate. The
central bank controlled the nominal interest rate to implement monetary policy.
Let us assume that the central bank follows the Taylor rule.
it = + t + xxt (77)
where  and x are satised the condition for uniqueness
(   1) + (1  )x > 0 (78)
The rule could minimize the deviations from the optimal path by choosing
su¢ ciently large values of  and x: A Taylor rule with very high ination
or output gap coe¢ cients would potentially lead to huge instrument-instability:
any small deviation of ination or the output gap from zero would imply innite
changes in the rate.
For more detail, we seek to Taylor (1993, 1999) and Judd and Rudebusch
(1988). Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998, 2000) estimate a forward looking ver-
sion of that rule, in which the interest rate is assumed to respond to anticipated
ination and output gap, instead of the realized values. Orphanides (1999)
discusses the di¢ culties and perils of implementing a Taylor-type rule in real
time.
3.2.3 Economic Disturbances
There were two commonly objectives of monetary policy that maintain a
low and stable average rate of ination and to stabilize output around full em-
ployment. A supply shock, such as an increase in oil prices, increases ination
and reduces output. To keep ination constant, central bank use contractional
policies that would exacerbate the decline in output; and to keep output at a
same level, they apply expansionary policies that would worsen ination. How-
ever, if the output objective is interpreted as meaning that output should be
stabilized around its exible-price equilibrium level, then (71) implies that the
central bank can always achieve a zero output gap. and keep ination equal to
zero. Solving (71) forward yielded,
t = 
1X
i=0
iEtxt+i: (79)
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Current and expected future output equal to the exible-price equilibrium
level, Etxt+i = 0 for all i and ination remains equal to zero. If we added an
error term to ination adjustment equation (71) becomes
t = Ett+1 + xt + et (80)
then
t = 
1X
i=0
iEtxt+i +
1X
i=0
iEtet+i: (81)
As long as
1X
i=0
iEtet+i 6= 0; maintaining t = 
1X
i=0
iEtxt+i is not su¢ -
cient to ensure that ination always remains equal to zero. Disturbances terms
in the ination adjustment equation are often called cost shocks or ination
shocks. Since shocks, unless they are permanent, ultimately a¤ect only the
price level, they are also called price shocks. Clarida Gali and Gertler (2001)
add the shochastic wage markup to shock in the ination adjustment equation to
represent deviations between the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption and the real wage. The labor supply (55) becomes
Wt
Pt
= (
Nt
C t
)e
w
t (82)
where wt is a random disturbance. If labor markets are imperfectly com-
petitive, it could arise from shochastic shifts in the markup of wages over the
marginal rate of substitution (Clarida Gali and Gertler 2002). When linearized
around the steady state, we obtain,
bnt + bct + wt = bwt   bpt (83)
The real marginal cost variable becomes
't = (bnt + bct)  (byt   bnt) + wt (84)
then, the ination adjustment equation became
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t = Ett+1 + ext + ewt (85)
In (85), we used wt as a source of ination shocks. If 
w
t is a markup due to
imperfect competition in the labor market, then wt also e¤ects the exible-price
equilibrium level of output.
3.2.4 Sticky Wages and Prices
The model of ination adjustment based on the Calvo specication (Erceg,
Henderson and Levin, 2000) implies that ination depends on real marginal
cost. In terms of deviations from the exible-price equilibrium, real marginal
cost equaled the gap between the real wage and the marginal product of la-
bor (mpl). Other models incorporating both wage and price stickiness include
those of Guerrieri (2000), Ravenna (2000), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2001), and Sbordone (2001, 2002). Erceg, Henderson, and Levin assume that
a randomly drawn fraction of households optimally set their wage each period,
just as the models of price stickiness assume that only a fraction of rms adjust
their price each period. Thus letting !t denote the real wage,
t = Ett+1 + (!t  mplt) (86)
Wage ination responds the appropriate gap depends on a comparison be-
tween the real wage and the households marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption. With exible wages and price stickiness, workers were
always on their labor supply curves; despite price stickiness, nominal wages
can adjust to ensure that the real wage equals the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between leisure and consumption (mrs). when wages are also sticky, this
means that !t < mrst workers will want to raise their nominal wage when the
opportunity to adjust arises.
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin showed that
wt = Et
w
t+1 + 
w(mrst   !t) (87)
where wt is the rate of nominal wage ination,
From the denition of real wage,
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!t = !t 1 + wt   t (88)
(86) and (88) constitute the ination adjustment block of an optimizing
model with both wage and price rigidities.
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) report that wage rigidity, not
price rigidity, is the key in accounting for the observed dynamics of ination
and output according to U.S. data. However, a model with sticky wages and
exible prices implies that real wages should move countercyclically; a monetary
policy expansion raises the price level, and the resulting decline in real wages
induces rms to increase employment and output. Huang and Liu (2002) ar-
gue that wage stickiness is more important than price stickiness for generating
output persistence. In contrast, Goodfriend and King (2001), while accepting
that nominal wages are sticky, argue that the long-term nature of employment
relationships means that nominal wage rigidity has little implication for real
resource allocation.
4 OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY
We have two key components; (71) and (76) while conducting optimal
monetary policy. Kerr and King (1996) discuss how the evaluation of interest-
rate policy rules can be axoa¤ected by the role of expected future output, while
McCallum and Nelson (1999) conduct an empirical evaluation of alternative
policy rules using a small model in which current aggregate demand depends
on expectations of future output. However Fuhrer (1997b) ignores the role of
expected future ination in the ination-adjustment equations, the actual policy
instrument it becomes
it = (1  B(1  a3)
a3
)t +
a1
a3
yt +
a2
a3
y
where the optimal decision rule will be in the form t = Bt
and B2 + (    2)B    = 0:
where stability of the ination process requires j1+Bj<1, so we take into
consideration the negative solution of B, and
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t  a1yt+a2yt 1 a3(it t)1 a3
For the parameter values of a1 = 1:53; a2 =   0:55; a3 = 0:35;  = 0:002 and
 = 0:989: The coe¢ cients of ination and output for this optimal policy rule
are dened as a function of , assume that  = 1; then the policy rule becomes
it = 1:50t + 4:37yt   1:57yt 1
Ball (1997) obtains for a similar exercise,
it = 1:48t + 0:8yt
Balls model has only one lag of output in the aggregate spending equa-
tion, unlike Fuhrer. He views his model as appropriate for annual data, so
the numbers reported are based on  = 0:96. His other parameter values are
a1 = 0:8; a3 = 1:0;  = 0:4: Note that this implies a much stronger response of
ination to output () and of spending to the interest rate (a3). These changes
a¤ect mainly the coe¢ cient on output. Ball also assumes that output enters
with a lag in the ination equation, so it should actually be yt 1 in the policy
rule. Both of these rules for adjusting the nominal interest rate are similar to
Taylor rules. Taylor (1993a) has shown that it = 1:5t + 0:5yt which provides
a good t to the behavior of the federal funds rate in the United States. Ac-
cording to the Taylor rule, the nominal rate is increased linearly proportional
to ination. This policy ensures a real rate response that will act to lower in-
ation. For a given ination rate, the real rate is also increased in response to
increase in output. Fuhrer and Moores and Balls parameter values have the
basic form of a Taylor rule, they both imply relative more weight on output
than characterizes the best t to actual U.S. policy, a point emphasized by Ball
(1999).
4.1 The Case Without Distortions
When nominal rigidities coexist with real imperfections, the exible price
equilibrium allocation was ine¢ cient and no longer optimal for the central bank.
We analyzed the optimal monetary policy problem where the presence of some
real imperfections generate a time-varying gap between output and its e¢ cient
counterpart, even in the absence of price rigidities. The representative house-
holds welfare losses are
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E0
( 1X
t=0
t
 
2t + xx
2
t
)
(89)
where xt  yt-yt denotes the welfare-relevant output gap, i.e. the deviation
between (log) output yt and its e¢ cient level yt :
t  pt   pt 1 denotes the rate of ination between periods t -1 and t.
x represents the weight of output gap uctuations (relative to ination) in
the loss function, and is given by x= 
where is the coe¢ cient on xt in the new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC),
and  is the elasticity of substitution between goods.
The central bank will seek to minimize (89) subject to
t = Et ft+1g+ xt + ut (90)
the disturbance ut  (yt   ynt )
Time variations in the gap between the e¢ cient and natural levels of output
generate a trade-o¤ for the monetary authority, since they make it impossible
to attain simultaneously zero ination and an e¢ cient level of activity. We refer
to disturbance ut which is AR(1) process in (90) as a cost-push shock.
ut = uut 1 + "
u
t (91)
where u 2 [0, 1) and f"ut g is a white noise process with constant variance
2u:
While (90) is the only constraint needed in order to determine the equilib-
rium path for output and ination under the optimal policy, implementation
of that policy requires an additional condition linking those variables with the
monetary policy instrument, i.e. the interest rate. This condition can be ob-
tained from the dynamic IS curve in terms of the welfare-relevant output gap,
xt =   1

(it   Et ft+1g   ret ) + Et fxt+1g (92)
where ret   + Et

yet+1
	
is the interest rate that supports the e¢ cient
allocation and which is invariant to monetary policy. We refer to ret as the
e¢ cient interest rate.
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The forward-looking nature of constraint (90) in the policy problem, requires
that we specify the extent to which the central bank can credibly commit in
advance to future policy actions. The following two sections characterize the
optimal monetary policy under discretionary and commitment. We compare
them in Conclusion section.
4.1.1 Optimal Discretionary Policy
Each period the monetary authority was assumed to choose (xt; t) in order
to minimize the period losses
2t + xx
2
t (93)
subject to the constraint
t = xt + t (94)
where the term t  Et ft+1g+ ut is taken as given.
By the monetary authority, since ut is exogenous and Et ft+1g is a func-
tion of expectations about future output gaps (as well as future uts) which by
assumption, cannot be currently inuenced by the policymaker.
The optimality condition was given by
xt =   
x
t (95)
for t = 0, 1, 2,...
In the face of inationary pressures resulting from a cost-push shock the cen-
tral bank must respond by driving output below its e¢ cient levelthus creating
a negative output gapwith the objective of dampening the rise in ination.
The condition (95) describes a relation between target variables that the discre-
tionary central bank will seek to maintain at all times and it is in that sense that
may be labeled a "targeting rule." Using (95) to substitute for xt in (90), we
obtain an expression for equilibrium ination under the optimal discretionary
policy:
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t = x
1
2 + x(1  u)
ut (96)
and expression for the output gap
xt =   1
2 + x(1  u)
ut (97)
Thus, under the optimal discretionary policy, the central bank lets the output
gap and ination deviate from their targets in proportion to the current value
of the cost-push shock. Finally, we see that the implied response of ination
leads naturally to a permanent change in the price level, whose size is increasing
in the persistence of the shock. The analysis above implicitly assumes that the
monetary authority can choose its desired level of ination and the output gap
at each point in time. One possible approach to implementing that policy is to
adopt an interest rate rule that guarantees that the desired outcome is attained.
it = r
e
t + t (98)
where   (1  u)x + u;
A rule of the form (98) leads to a determinate equilibrium (corresponding to
the desired outcome) if and only if the ination coe¢ cient is greater than one
(Taylor Principle) or, equivalently, if and only if  > x.
In practice, interest rate rules like (98) are not easy to implement, they
require knowledge of the models parameters, and real-time observation of vari-
ations in the cost-push shock and the e¢ cient interest rate. Those di¢ culties
have led some authors to emphasize "targeting rules" like (95) as practical guides
for monetary policy, as opposed to "instrument rules" like (98). Under a target-
ing rule, the central bank would adjusts its instrument until a certain optimal
relation between target variables is satised. In our example, however, following
such a targeting rule requires that the e¢ cient level of output yet be observed in
real time, in order to determine the output gap xt.
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4.1.2 Optimal Policy under Commitment
A central bank is assumed to be able to commit, with full credibility, to a
policy plan. In the context of our model such a plan consists of a specication
of the desired levels of ination and the output gap at all possible dates and
states of nature, current and future. More specically, the monetary authority
is assumed to choose a state-contingent sequence that minimizes
1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t(2t + xx
2
t ) (99)
subject to the sequence of constraints:
t = Etft+1g+ xt + ut (100)
"targeting rule" which the central bank must follow period by period in order
to implement the optimal policy under commitment like as in (95) is
xt =   
x
bt (101)
for t=0,1,2,... where bpt  pt   p 1 is the (log) deviation between the price
level and an "implicit target" given by the price level prevailing once period
before the central bank chooses its optimal plan.
(101) is viewed as a "targeting rule" which the central bank must follow
period by period in order to implement the optimal policy under commitment.
The di¤erence between (95) and (101) is that the optimal discretionary policy
requires that the central bank keeps output below (above) its e¢ cient level as
long as ination is positive (negative). By way of contrast, under the optimal
policy with commitment the central bank sets the sign and size of the output
gap in proportion to the deviations of the price level from its implicit target.
bpt = bpt 1 + 
(1  u)
ut (102)
for t=0,1,2,... where   1 
p
1 4a2
2a 2 (0; 1); and a  xx(1+)+2 :
and output gap is
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xt = xt 1   
x(1  u)
ut (103)
and the forward looking ination
t = xt + 
1X
k=1
kEt fxt+kg+ ut (104)
The central bank can o¤set the inationary impact of a cost push shock
by lowering the current output gap xt, but also by committing to lower future
output gaps (or, equivalently, future reductions in the price level). If credible,
such "promises" will bring about a downward adjustment in the sequence of
expectations Etfxt+kg for k=1,2,3,... As a result, and in response to a positive
realization of the cost-push shock ut; the central bank may achieve any given
level of current ination t with a smaller decline in the current output gap xt:
Equilibrium nominal rate under the optimal policy with commitment where
serially uncorrolated cost push shocks (u = 0):
it = r
e
t   (1  )(1 

x
)bpt (105)
4.2 The Case With Distortions
Uncorrelated real imperfections generate a permanent gap between the nat-
ural and the e¢ cient levels of output, which is reected in an ine¢ cient steady
state. The size of the steady state distortion by a parameter  representing the
wedge between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substi-
tution between consumption and hours, both evaluated at the steady state.
The representative households welfare losses in a neighborhood of the zero
ination steady state is expressed as
E0
1X
t=0
t

1
2
 
2t + xx
2
t
  bxt (106)
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where    > 0 (i.e.   1   1 > 0; where  is the steady state gross
markup) and bxt = xt x represents the deviation of the welfare-relevant output
gap from its value x < 0 in the zero ination steady state.bxt captures the fact that any marginal increase in output has a positive e¤ect
on welfare (thus increasing welfare losses), since output is assumed that to be
below its e¢ cient level.
The central bank will seek to minimize (106) subject to
t = Et ft+1g+ bxt + ut (107)
where the disturbance ut  (byet   bynt )
4.2.1 Optimal Discretionary Policy
The monetary authority is assumed to choose (xt; t) in order to minimize
the period losses
1
2
(2t + xbx2t )  bxt (108)
subject to the constraint
t = bxt + t (109)
where the term t  Et ft+1g+ ut is taken as given.
The optimality condition is given by
xt =

x
  
x
t (110)
for t = 0, 1, 2,...
(108) implies for any given level of ination, a more expansionary policy
than in the absence of a steady state distortion. This is a consequence of the
desire by the central bank to partly correct for the ine¢ ciently low average level
of activity.
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We obtain an expression for equilibrium ination under the optimal discre-
tionary policy:
t =

2 + x(1  ) + x	ut (111)
and expression for the output gap
bxt = (1  )
2 + x(1  )   	ut (112)
Thus, we see that the presence of a distorted steady state does not a¤ect
the response of the output gap and ination to shocks under the optimal policy.
It has, however, an e¤ect on the average levels of ination and the output gap
around which the economy uctuates. In particular, when the natural level of
output and employment are ine¢ ciently low ( > 0) the optimal discretionary
policy leads to positive average ination, as a consequence of the central banks
incentive to push output above its natural steady state level. That incentive
increases with the degree of ine¢ ciency of the natural steady state, which ex-
plains the fact that the average ination is increasing in (and hence in), giving
rise to the classical ination bias phenomenon.
4.2.2 Optimal Policy under Commitment
As in the case of an e¢ cient steady state the equilibrium price level for the
optimal policy under commitment
bpt = bpt 1 + 
(1  u)
ut +

1   (113)
for t=0,1,2,... where   1 
p
1 4a2
2a 2 (0; 1); and a  xx(1+)+2 :
and output gap is
bxt = bxt 1   
x(1  u)
ut + 

1  (1 + 
2
x(1  ) )

(114)
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Presence of a distorted steady state response to a cost-push shock didnt
a¤ect under the optimal policy with commitment as in the discretionary policy
characterized by an identical stabilization bias. Within distortion an additional
di¤erence arises between the discretionary and commitment policies, unrelated
to the response to shocks: it has to do with the deterministic component of ina-
tion and its evolution over time. In the case of discretion that component takes
the form a constant positive mean, resulting from the period-by-period incentive
to close the gap between output and its e¢ cient level, which results in ination.
In the case of commitment, however, we see that the price level converges as-
ymptotically to a constant, given by limT!1pT = p 1+ (1 )(1 ) :Hence, after
displaying a positive value at the beginning of the optimal plans implementa-
tion, the deterministic component of ination (around which actual ination
uctuates in response to shocks) declines gradually over time, following the
path 
t+1
1  : Hence, under the optimal plan the economy eventually converges
to an equilibrium characterized by zero average ination, and in that sense ob-
servationally equivalent to that of an economy with an e¢ cient steady steady
state. The central banks ability to commit avoids (at least asymptotically) the
ination bias that characterizes the outcome of the discretionary policy.
5 CONCLUSION
We have two results about this thesis that involve only interest rate as an
instrument in a manner of monetary policy in a closed economy. The rst result
is about MIU model, the other result is about New Keynesian Model. As we
mentioned above, under the Friedman Rule (it = 0) the economy experiences a
deation in the long run. This may create indeterminacy in the price level and
central bank avoid it by using the rule it = (rt 1+ t) for some  >1. On the
other side, the stationary solution is only satised when it = 0. So t =  rt 1:
Friedman (1969) concludes that the optimal ination rate must be negative to
make nominal rate of interest zero. At the New Keynesian side, we decide which
policy instrument equation gives better results, discretion or commitment. And
what the coe¢ cients of ination and output implies in the di¤erent versions of
Taylor rules. We decide whether the rule gives optimal results or not according
to t the U.S. data, (Walsh, 2003). In general, Taylor Rule tries to minimize the
deviations from the optimal path by choosing su¢ cient values of  and/or x,
ination and/or output gap coe¢ cients. The large values would potentially lead
to huge instrument-instability: any small deviation of ination or the output
gap from zero would imply innite changes in the rate.
Finally, when we compare optimal discretionary and commitment monetary
policy to understand what we gain from commitment. While under the optimal
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discretionary policy, central bank keeps output below (above) its e¢ cient level
as long as ination is positive (negative), under commitment the sign and size
of the output gap is determined in proportion to the deviations of the price level
from its implicit target.
Discretion and commitment are identical if the cost shock is serially uncor-
related (u = 0). If 0 < u < 1, there is a stabilization bias under discretion
relative to the case of committing to a simple rule. When u > 0, there is no
average ination bias. The increase in ination and decline of output resulting
from a unit cost-push shock is smaller under commitment than under discretion.
Under discretion, the output gap returns to zero once the shock dies out. By
way of contrast, under commitment the output gap remains negative well after
the direct e¤ects of the shock have vanished, and returns to its initial level only
asymptotically. The welfare losses associated with the optimal policy with com-
mitment (0.17 %) are smaller than in the discretion (0.22 %) case. We have a
standard deviations of the output gap (%3.17) and yearly ination 1.39 % with
commitment, whereas 3.80 % of output gap and 1.38 % of ination deviation
under discretion (according to calibration of Gali, 2001).
The distortion caused an ination bias under discretion. Kydland and
Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), and Rogo¤ (1985) indicates the
central banks inability to commit a low ination policy when there is a per-
sistence rising ination. Besides Persson and Tabellini (1990) discuss in-depth
this literature. Many of the most important papers are collected in Persson
and Tabellini (1994a). Without such a bias an e¢ cient outcome characterized
by zero output and zero ination can be attained under discretion. In other
words, in the absence of an ination bias there would not be any gains from
commitment. In Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (1999b), they
get potential welfare gains response to shocks that generate a trade-o¤ between
output and ination without an ination bias.
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